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Natural Law 
and the ~DecIaration on Euthanasia' 
Rev. Gerald D. Coleman, S.S. 
A member of the American province, Society of St. Sulpice, Father 
Coleman received his doctorate from the Institute of Christian 
Thought, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto in 1974. He has 
gained experience as associate professor of moral and pastoral 
theology at St. Patrick's Seminary, Menlo Park, California and as 
chairman of the department of moral theology, as well as through 
membership on the medical-moral board, as pro-synodal judge for the 
marriage tribunal, and censor of books, all for the Archdiocese of San 
Francisco. 
Introduction 
On June 26, 1980, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith issued a 3,000 word document, "Declaration On Euthanasia." 
The document itself presents a certain view of the human person, a 
view which is strongly grounded in a natural law theory. There is also 
a great stress on reason within this text, with an underlying motif that 
a good moral argument is always reasonable. 
This paper will attempt to discern the reasonableness which sup-
ports the Declaration by specifically indicating the Thomistic concept 
of natural law which girds the document. After viewing these funda-
mental natural law elements as located specifically in St. Thomas's 
Summa Theologica I-II, q. 90-96 ("Treatise on Law"), we will draw 
out some of the pastoral conclusions which flow logically from the 
manner in which the question of euthanasia is posed. 
Declaration on Euthanasia 
1. The Text Itself 
The document begins by reminding us of the "lofty dignity of the 
human person" and this person's "right to life." This "reminder" finds 
continual repetition in the document; for example, every human 
person possesses inherent "fundamental rights" and these rights every-
one "has the duty to care for .... " 
After establishing this fact as universally accepted ("will meet with 
the approval of many people of good will"), the document then 
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reminds us that Christ has given a new meaning to t his "lofty dignity" 
of t he human person: "Christ ... has given a new meaning to 
existence .. .. " The Declaration adds here an interesting correlation : 
that for those who are non-Christian, "faith in God the creator" 
should supply this new perspective. In other words, every human per-
son sustains a special dignity by the very fact of his or her humanity; 
and faith in Jesus or faith in God adds a deeper meaning to this human 
fact. 
In light of this fai t h-assertion, t he document then draws certain 
consequences: (a) it is a fundamental right that innocent life must 
always be safeguarded; (b) every person is obliged to live his or her life 
in accordance with God's plan; and (c) since God is the author of all 
life ("God 's sovereignty"), no one save God can intentionally destroy 
human life (examples given in the text are "causing one's own death" 
and " murder"). The text does distinguish here t he concept of 
"suicide" and the "sacrifice of one's life . .. for a higher cause ." 
After stating these consequences of the lofty dignity of every 
human person, the document speaks of " mercy killing" in order to 
arrive at its definition of euthanasia: "an action or an omission which 
of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in 
this way be eliminated. Euthanasia's terms of reference .. . are to be 
found in the intention of the will and in the methods used." 
The Declaration then restates its fundamental assertion of the 
"dignity of the human person" and thus, in light of its definition of 
euthanasia, rules out in any way "the killing of an innocent human 
being." No person may seek such an "act of killing" either for his or 
her own self or for another person ; nor can one consent to such an 
act. Even should an "error of judgment" be made on this account, 
such ending of life would objectively constitute an " act of killing." 
The text goes on to speak of the positive place for suffering in 
human life ("no on denies the usefulness" and suffering "has a special 
place in God's saving plan"). While making a strong assertion of this 
fact, the document likewise admits that an " heroic way of acting" can 
never be imposed on any individual and thus does "prudence" suggest 
"the use of medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing pain." The 
document's use of prudence in this regard is nuanced by a reference to 
Pope Pius XII's caution, "It is not right to deprive the dying person of 
consciousness without a serious reason." 
Aside from a series of "applications" and "clarifications" which 
follow from the text, the document concludes by suggesting that it is 
perhaps better to approach this whole question from the view of 
"proportionate/disproportionate" means rather than the traditional 
"ordinary /extraordinary" means. The Declaration indicates in this 
regard the necessity of carefully--discerning a sick person 's " physical 
and moral resources" and in view of this estimation come to some 
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"correct judgment" as to what might constitute proportionate/dis-
proportionate means for this particular individual ("by studying the 
type of treatment to be used, its degree of complexity or risk, its cost 
and the possibilities of using it and comparing these elements with the 
result that can be expected"). 
2. Interpretation of the Text 
In light of the natural law thinking which underlies this document, 
the Declaration approaches the question of euthanasia from a middle 
position, i.e., it is not medical-moral optimism (e.g., every means must 
be used at whatever cost to sustain life) nor is it medical-moral 
pessimism (e.g., life should be ended when it becomes burdensome) 
or, as one writer comments, the document steers a middle course 
between "an idolatrous vitalism and an uncritical scientism - both of 
which try to deny death by refusing to let life end." One is here 
reminded of Hilaire Belloc's insightful quip: 
Of old when men lay sick and sorely tried, 
The doctors gave them physic and they died: 
But here's a happier age, for now we know 
Both how to make men sick and keep them so! 
In other words, prudential judgment is highlighted in the text, sug-
gesting that each person must be considered in his or her individ-
uality. 
The document has likewise shifted emphasis from a metaphysical to 
a more personalistic approach, from death as the separation of body 
and soul to the notion that death is a truly human and personal 
activity. The text thus teaches that we no longer need to fear death, 
either our own or someone else's, because death is not an enemy but 
can be a welcome friend. In taking this approach, the document avoids 
simplistic one-rubric ethics. In other words, there is more involved in 
this whole question than the patient and ordinary/extraordinary 
means. The questions of social justice (where "too heavy a burden 
on ... families and society" could be imposed) and charity (the neces-
sity to provide the sick and the dying "with the comfort of boundless 
kindness and heartful charity") must always be considered. 
In other words, asocial ethics has no place in the medical care arena. 
One is here reminded of the comment of Merrick, the elephant man in 
Bernard Pomerance's play, The Elephant Man, in which he indicates 
that Romeos are undependable because they do not care: 
Does he take her pulse? Does he get a doctor? Does he make sure? No. He 
kills himself. The illusion fools him because he does not care for her. He 
only cares about himself. If I had been Romeo, we would have got away. 
In employing the concepts of proportionate/disproportionate, the 
Declaration says something very important ethically: that one cannot 
indicate what is right or wrong morally in all possible circumstances. 
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The text admits that we do not have a divine knowledge of all possible 
options and their moral meaning. Such an approach would imply that 
something is really good or bad, regardless of the reality-constituting 
circumstances. 
In other words, we always have a duty-to-care, but our responsibil-
ity to sustain human life is a relative one rather than an absolute one; 
that is, it depends on the circumstances in which treatment is offered 
and the total condition of the patient. 
Finally, the document attempts to sort out a positive role for 
suffering/crucifixion in one's life. In this treatment I am reminded of 
Flannery O'Connor's statement: 
I have never been anywhere but sick! In a sense sickness is a place more 
instructive than a long trip to Europe. Sickness before death is a very 
appropriate thing and I think those who die suddenly and those who don't 
have illness have missed one of God's miracles. 
In other words, the document views suffering and death much more 
positively than in the past. It is a liberating experience by which a 
person enters a free and full conversation with God. There is an 
implication in this approach that dying is painful because sin has 
caused us disintegration: we want to minimize the agony of dying and 
thus, perhaps through a technological ethos, make death really anti-
human. 
The text, then, condemns the positive termination of the unwanted 
dying by advocating that we discover ways in which real care and con-
cern for the dying can be expressed to the very end. In this way, the 
Declaration suggests, the suffering person is more favorably disposed 
for his or her conversation with God; and those who remain have been 
given the benefit of not merely witnessing this preparation, but sup-
portively sharing the final steps in the life-journey of one's brother or 
sister. 
Natural Law in Saint Thomas 
In our interpretation of the "Declaration On Euthanasia," we have 
stressed four elements: 
1. Each person must be respected in his or her own individuality; 
this "lofty dignity" must always be reverenced. 
2. There can be no asocial ethic: social justice and charity must 
always mark our human behavior in caring for the sick and the 
dying. 
3. Circumstances and the total good of a person must always be 
considered; our duty-to-care is thus a relative one rather than an 
absolute one. 
4. Sin causes human disintegration and thus is dying painful; we 
must, then, discover ways of real care to assist one who suffers to 
prepare for his or her conversation with God. 
262 Linacre Quarterly 
These elements are not simply humanistic rhetoric, but find a 
grounding in the natural law of St. Thomas. In his "Treatise on Law" 
(mentioned above), these texts are specifically helpful in our present 
discussion: 
1. The last end of human life is bliss or happiness .... Consequently the 
law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness (q. 90). 
2. Every law is ordained to the common good (q. 90). 
3. The light of natural reason ... is nothing else than an imprint on us of 
the Divine ligh t. It is . .. the rational creature 's participation of the 
eternal law (q. 91). 
4. The first principle in the practical reason is ... that good is that which all 
things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be 
done and ensued, and evi l is to be avoided (q. 94). 
5. In man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the 
nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every 
substance seeks the preservation of its own being ... ; and by reason of 
this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of 
warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law (q. 94). 
6. Some things are ... derived from the general principles of the natural 
law, by way of conclusions ; e.g., that one must not kill may be derived as 
a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man (q. 
95). 
From these texts of Aquinas, certain elements are clear: that a 
thing is moral to the extent that it truly reflects both the natural law 
and the eternal law, for God is the ultimate ground of morality . More-
over, since each part exists for the good of the whole, every person 
should be inclined toward the common good. The first good to be 
done, a good common to all creatures, is self-preservation. Finally, we 
are all obliged to live our lives as coming from God and moving back 
to God (exitus a Deo, reditus ad Deum). Every moral decision, then, 
sustains a religious depth; in every moral decision we respond to God. 
The "Declaration On Euthanasia" bases itself on this framework. 
Every person is to be respected in his/her individuality since God has 
imprinted Himself on all persons; this is a dignity that deserves our 
absolute respect. In addition, there can be no ego-centered morality 
for the Christian, as we must always consider carefully the common 
good. Every moral decision has its own specificity, however, as some 
conclusions must be derived from general principles. Our ultimate end 
is to be with God, our true happiness; we must thus work against 
those obstacles which prevent the preservation of human life. 
Pastoral Conclusions 
The finality of death and its insoluble mysterious quality make it 
unique among human experiences. Although one cannot choose one's 
birth, one can choose to die. This choice, with all its medical, psycho-
logical, moral and spiritual ramifications, is at the heart of the "Dec-
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laration On Euthanasia." In turn, the document itself rests on certain 
presuppositions about human life and its preservation, assumptions 
which find expression in the natural law tradition of St. Thomas. His 
vision assists us in understanding the document's focus on the ques-
tions of suffering and dying. 
These questions are not merely academic but tou ch the daily lives 
of all people. The celebrated cases of Brother Joseph C. Fox and 
Karen A. Quinlan only highlight the life and death decisions which 
many persons and families face each day at home and in health care 
centers across the nation. 
In light of these ultmate questions and the perspective and prin-
ciples set down in the "Declaration On Euthanasia," the recent guide-
lines of Richard A. McCormick and Robert Veatch seem informed and 
reasonable: 
1. Society and the Church place a great value on the family. It is the basic 
moral community . Familial self·determination is thus warranted. Family 
members are in the best position to assess the best interest of an incom-
petent family member who is fac ing death. The State should intervene 
only when the familial judgment exceeds the limits of reason. 
2. Every patient must be accorded full dignity as a human person. Incompe-
tent patients and formerly competent patients who have not expressed 
themselves cl ea rly and adequately while competent must be afforded this 
same dignity. "We must affirm the moral obligations placed upon others 
that th is implies. Someone must have the responsibility of de termining 
what is in such a patient's best interest" (p. 394). Family members of 
family surrogates are in the best position to know a family member's 
style, preferences and values ("The Preservation of Life and Se lf-Deter-
mination," Theological Studies, 41 [1980 1 , pp. 390-396). 
The Declaration concludes with an interpretation of Matthew 
25: 40: "Such service to people is also service to Christ the Lord .... " 
God has imprinted His image in all human persons, possessing them of 
great value and dignity. This uniqueness must always be respected, 
although the particular details must be discerned in every specific sit-
uation, as the good of the whole person is being honored. The Declara-
tion is a statement of the affirmation owed to every human person. 
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